Fix the Court today received documents from two FOIA requests to the U.S. Marshals Service that answer several questions — and raise new ones — about the security apparatus covering lower court judges amid a rising number of threats against them.

Last April, FTC submitted a request for data on the size of the force and expenditures for covering judges, any changes in staffing numbers from FY20-FY24, the number of threats and security trainings during those years, a description of what constitutes a threat and details about two key programs, one that reimburses judges for home security systems, called HIDS, and one that redacts judges’ personally identifiable information from the Internet.

In 2023, we sought information on how many judges and judiciary staff had signed up for the PII redaction program, how much online information was, in fact, redacted and who was managing the program.

The goal is to exercise oversight; in other words, the public should know if there’s been a mass exodus among deputy marshals who cover our judges or courthouses, why hundreds of judges aren’t enrolling themselves in HIDS and how often data brokers are balking when asked to take down info.

The answers we received are not totally satisfactory but help complete an increasingly important picture given the rising power of federal judges and the increased danger of the job.

On personnel (p. 1 responding to this request; cover letters here and here), USMS did not disclose how many deputy marshals were assigned to the SCOTUS residential beat, which was scrambled after the May 2022 Dobbs opinion leak.

But the documents do note that nearly twice as many DUSMs left the Service (223) as were hired (122) in FY24, and that only about 100 individuals were working full-time in the Judicial Security Division and Office of Protective Intelligence between FY20 and FY24, a surprising admission given the years-long upward trajectory of threats and the fact that there are 94 federal districts (i.e., this is akin to one official per district).

The next page (p. 2) shows that DUSMs logged an astounding hours 201,180 hours of overtime — equivalent to 23 years — in FY24, though the breakdown by division is completely redacted, so it’s difficult to assess further.

On a positive note, the data show (p. 5) that USMS trained in person 2,680 individuals in FY24, from as far away as Anchorage to as close to home as the AO’s Thurgood Marshall Building. (We believe “JASAT” stands for “judiciary active shooter/active threat” training.) Based on the descriptions of these trainings, most of these were not judges but were likely court staff, but as far as judge-specific training goes, the documents show (pp. 3-6) that jurists are offered security training at several key points during their careers: during the nomination phase, during FJC new-judge orientations and when judges ascend to the position of chief judge — and (p. 11) there is “annual security training within each district.”

Recall that it’s not just deputy marshals protecting judges; there are also court security officers (p. 7), who are the first line of defense at courthouses, checking individuals who come to court through magnetometers at the entrances, among other security (primarily in-building) responsibilities. It’s also helpful to remember that CSO contractors can have multibillion-dollar contracts with USMS, meaning there should be some oversight here. This is especially important given that there are not many companies who, per USMS, can carry out the work: USMS has sanctioned four, but two of those appear to no longer have active contracts.

There are no action items for us on CSOs; we’re mainly interested in them for tracking purposes over time, and it’ll be worth watching the “total court facilities” number (also p. 7) into the future, as the Trump administration, through DOGE, called for a reduction in that number last year.

On the disappointing side, the response letter (p. 3) says that USMS “does not capture” the number of arrests made by USMS of individuals who threatened judges. (We also asked for a breakdown of that data by district, and that was also not captured.)

We asked for data about the USMS Personally Identifiable Information Redaction and Reduction program, which started as a voluntary program in March 2022 (p. 212) but was formalized — i.e., penalties were created for noncompliance — after the passage of the Andrel Act in Dec. 2022. The response said that the data lies with the AO, and in light that, we’re considering adding this request as part of our Judicial Open Records Act, the first draft of which we released during Sunshine Week last week.

Finally, the Marshals included an FAQ about HIDS, which helpfully explains certain aspects of the program, though unfortunately redacts a question we’ve long had, can judges’ secondary residences, like vacation homes, get free security systems? Also redacted was an answer on “minimum features” of HIDS, which, given what the answer could be, is probably for the best, though we hope that cameras and motion detectors are part of that answer.

It’s still unknown why only 1,972 of the 2,726 eligible judges, or 72.3%, were enrolled in HIDS on the date of our request (Apr. 23, 2025), which tracks with the AO’s annual report (graf 9). While many of the rest may have their own systems that they’re paying for, it’s unlikely that all 754 judges are paying out of pocket, and we’d like to know more about why the enrollment rate isn’t higher.

There’s also the matter of the 240% increase in HIDS costs between FY21 and FY22 (p. 3). That may be due to a branch-wide push for home security checks and alarm installations following the 2020 death of Daniel Anderl. But there are other possibilities for the increase, and we’ll soon ask about that.

Documents from second FOIA request

In the other FOIA, which we submitted three years ago, we asked for the number of takedown requests made by judges under the Anderl Act and its predecessor law, which permitted USMS to ask data brokers and the like for “voluntary” removal of PII.

The response (p. 3) from the Marshals? “[T]he USMS does not maintain any [such] information […]. The program for removal of personally identifiable information of U.S. Judges or Justices is not a USMS program; it is program specific to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.” We also received two pages with little useful information, save the number of judges who had signed up for the PII removal program by July 2022, which was redacted.

That answer we received also presumes the AO is hiring DeleteMe, IronWall 360 and other contractors working to remove PII. And yet, the funding for this program in the federal budget comes in the USMS section (cf., pp. 286-287). We’ll be looking into this more over the coming weeks.

In addition, FTC plans to resubmit parts of these requests and ask for FY25 and FY26 numbers shortly.